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Issues in animal research

Animal Model Research: The Apples and Oranges
Quandary
Kenneth J. Shapiro
Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 403 McCauley Street, Washington Grove, MD 20880,
USA
E-mail: kshapiro@psyeta.org
Summary — In this paper, I explore the premises underlying the problem of the evaluation of animal models. I argue that the presence of similarities and differences between the model and the modelled, although
historically and currently a dominant antinomy framing evaluation, is not a bottom-line consideration.
What is critical is 1) whether we learn and 2) whether we improve treatment through the animal model
research. Similarity between model and modelled and the closely related concept of validity are not coterminus with these critical evaluative measures. In fact, differences between the model and modelled also
can provide impetus to new understanding and treatment innovations. The apples and oranges argument
— that model and modelled are incommensurable — whether based on theoretical or empirical grounds,
is not an adequate critique. Continuing argument that relies heavily on similarities versus differences is
unconstructive, reducing to the proverbial half-empty/half-full bottle argument.
Key words: animal models, evaluation, validation.

Introduction
In my view, science-based arguments are less well
developed than are ethics-based arguments in the
debate over animal research. At the 3rd World
Congress, I presented a paper on the problem of the
scientific evaluation of animal models (1). In it, I
critically reviewed the history of evaluative methods, outlined a method using standard social scientific methods, and gave some examples of its
application (2). My effort here is to deepen the science arguments through a critique of the present
strategy at the level of the concepts that presently
frame it.
A great deal of the debate over animal research
centres on whether the model and modelled are best
thought of as similar or different: can they be sufficiently similar to allow extrapolation from model to
modelled; to the degree that they are different, does
not that invalidate a model; if they are similar, does
not that fact preclude our use of them?
The present thesis is that a similarity/difference
(S/D) calculus is not the bottom-line consideration
in the evaluation of animal models of biomedical
and psychological research. What is critical is
whether we learn (the basic science question) and
whether we improve treatment through the use of
models (the applied science question). These are not
necessarily directly related to validity and similarity or inversely related to differences and invalidity.
More critically, animal models can and must be
assessed independently of S/D.
On a personal note, my exploration of S/D as an
organising frame began a decade ago, when writing

a book on the evaluation of animal models (3).
Although I approached that work with the view
that S/D was a prospective cleaver, I found that it
does not work either on a conceptual or empirical
level. In fact, a review of the history of the animal
research debate revealed that the S/D frame contributed to the perpetuation of the largely polarised
state of the controversy. This led me to adopt standard social scientific evaluative methods, such as
citation analysis, survey of relevant users, measures of pain and treatment evaluation studies. I
believe the use of these methods puts the science
argument on a stronger footing, both in the evaluation of any particular proposal and in the larger
debate over the appropriateness and effectiveness
of the animal model strategy generally.
A disclaimer: I am talking about basic and applied
biomedical and psychological research here, not toxicity testing. As the purpose and procedures in the
two enterprises are different, so is the meaning and
locus of S/D and validation, as I will clarify.
I begin with some introductory material to 1)
establish the concepts and historical backdrops of
S/D and 2) show that indeed S/D is a primary frame
within which people think about animal research.

Discussion
People use the titular cliché, “like comparing apples
and oranges”, to argue that two items are so different as to be incomparable. If the apple were a model
of the orange, could we learn anything about
oranges from the study of apples, the basic science
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question; and, the applied science question, could
we learn to grow them better.
Upon reflection, of course, apples and oranges are
alike in many ways. On a gross morphological level,
both are round and of similar size, have skins, seeds
and pulp; both grow on trees and have similar stages
in development. On a more abstract and conceptual
level, both are fruit, edible, and good for you. On a
molecular level, both are chemically acidic, largely
consist of water, and have similar cellular structure.
They are a lot alike and a lot different.
More generally, for any two things that are not
identical, there exists a set of similarities and differences. That is why metaphoric or analogical talk
is so rich and evocative — a person is a banana.
Pairings vary in the degree of S/D. We can construct
a meaningful metaphor from virtually any pairing.
Many, but not all, such pairings give us insights
into the meaning of the target object for which an
analogy has been constructed. The mind is a computer.
Philosophers use the term “incommensurable” to
refer to two things so different that any comparison
is misleading. Is a typical animal model and target
incommensurable? Unfortunately, for those opposing animal research, they are not. For a typical animal model/modelled, similarities obtain relevant to
the purpose of drawing the comparison. But, fortunately, and more importantly, I will show that such
similarities are not critical in the evaluation of the
model. In any case, how can we judge this? How
much are apples and oranges similar and how much
different? Are they more similar than different? Are
the similarities more critical in any gains made
from the model?
I am arguing that measures of increased understanding and more effective treatment are critical
to the evaluation of animal models, while measures
of the degree of similarity to differences are not,
and that these two sets of measures are not related
in any simple way.
History of S/D in the comparison of humans
and other animals
A major theme in Western thought is the concept of
human being: what is a “man”, or a “person”?
Animals other than humans provide an important
categorical foil in the evolution of this concept. A
brief survey of changes in the concept of human
being reveals shifts from a view that emphasises
differences between humans and other animals
(H/A), to one that emphasises similarities, to a
mixed or ambivalent view, to, again, similarities as
focal.
In the Western classical tradition, both GrecoRoman and Judeo-Christian thinkers described a
discrete categorical difference between H/A — the
first based on the possession of rationality, the sec-
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ond of a soul. Descartes continued this traditional
categorical cleavage, opposing the human rationality/soul to the machine-like nature and thus radical
differentness or otherness of animals other than
humans.
In his theory of evolution, Darwin shifts from an
emphasis on discontinuity to continuity. Beneath
the apparent differences in the panoply of life
forms, he finds a common ancestry. Although
Darwin also uses differences to define species, his
scientific style of thought unifies apparently disparate phenomena under general principles, to
emphasise similarity and continuity. Humans are
made in the image of animals other than humans,
not God. The contemporary synthesis of Darwinian
Theory and genetics also emphasises continuity by
demonstrating similarity at the biochemical level,
in addition to the anatomical, physiological, and
behavioural levels.
This mixed or ambiguous modern scientific view
is reinforced by the complexity of contemporary
constructions of animals, such as the “pet”, in
which animals connote both human-like members
of the family and vestiges of our bestial ancestors.
Arguably, we are on the cusp of a movement back
to an emphasis on similarity through the influence
of biocentrism, the ecological viewpoint, theories of
systemic relations (chaos theory), cognitive ethology and genetic engineering. Together, these developments discover and literarily create animals that
are more like us in intellective and social capabilities and in physiological function.
Singer’s scientists’ dilemma
Singer exploits the perennial antinomy of S/D in his
analysis of the dilemma facing researchers (4). He
argues that scientists emphasise similarity to justify their research, but, implicitly, difference to justify the use of non-human animals in procedures to
which they would not subject humans.
Unfortunately, the incoherence cuts the other way
in the arguments of animal advocates. Anti-vivisectionists argue difference to disqualify the experiment
(the science argument), but use similarity to argue
equal consideration (the ethics argument). Interestingly, its precursor, the 19th century humane
movement posited difference as the basis of obligation of kindness to non-human animals — only
humans (of a certain social class) are capable of being
kind to other beings (hence the term “humane”).
The concept of model in terms of S/D
As by definition any model/modelled relation is one
of analogy not identity, the relation consists of a set
of similarities, as well as differences. Despite this,
scientists, at different times historically and in dif-
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ferent contexts currently (media and political settings), have claimed that models are similar “in
every respect” (5). In response, opponents of animal
research refute this claim by describing respects in
which a particular model is different from the condition modelled. The result is a significant waste of
time and energy and a failure of constructive dialogue.
Recently, LaFollette & Shanks (6) offered the following criterion for the evaluation of an animal
model: For a model to be a good model, “there must
be no causal relevant disanalogies between the
model and the thing modelled”. On the basis of evolutionary, systems and chaos theory, they argue
that, in principle, model and target cannot be identical or “isomorphic”.
This is a straw person argument. One does not
need these sophisticated theories to argue that the
model and target are not causally identical, as it is
true by definition, logic and common sense. Even a
non-human animal infected with the same tuberculosis germ as a human has a different disease than
the human so infected. Even an animal genetically
engineered to have a compromised human immune
system has a different immune system in a different
physiological setting and a different disease than a
human.
LaFollette & Shanks justify their extended exercise by pointing to the writings of Claude Bernard,
in which he argues that identity is possible by way
of a now outmoded view of the necessary relation
between function and physiology. They also refer to
the American Medical Association paper referenced
immediately above that denies the necessity of
model/modelled differences (5).
Validity and similarity
Validity is a major concept in the current debate
over the effectiveness of animal models. The validity of a model refers to the degree of model/modelled
similarity or its fidelity. High fidelity models claim
to duplicate very closely causal mechanisms in the
target disorder; low fidelity models are only loosely
analogous to it. Compare a pump as a model of the
workings of a heart; a telephone switchboard and,
more recently, a computer as a brain; mathematical
models of the nervous system; and structural models of biochemical reactions.
In toxicity testing, investigators search for a
model that can be used as a substitute or stand-in
for the target. They require the model to react in
the same way as the target to the presence of a drug
or other product in terms of potency, efficacy and
toxicity. Here, high fidelity is critical. A model, to be
useful, must function as a putative locus of validation — notwithstanding the fact that the drugs and
products eventually are tested in the human context. By contrast, in basic and applied research, the
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function of the model is different and broader. The
primary function of these low fidelity models is to
generate hypotheses that can be tested in the target.
Validity is distinguished from reliability: the latter refers to the problem of consistency, repeatability and accuracy of measurement; the former to the
degree to which what is measured is what one
intended to be measured. In the model research
context, reliability does not relate to similarity or
fidelity of model to target, but to confidence in
measurement of relevant variables in the model.
The relation between validity and the problem of
evaluation of animal models is complex and often
misunderstood. I present the following effort at
clarification as three propositions.
1. An animal model is never finally or fully validated.
Validity is relative as a model and target can never
be completely the same. Validity is with respect to
any particular aspect or relationship of the disorder being modelled. The degree of validity of a
model is a function of the accumulated aspects
compared and found similar to date. Validity is ongoing and relative, and it is not a bottom-line criterion for evaluation. We never can say we have a
model of depression, bulimia or cystic fibrosis in
the strong sense that it can function as the locus of
validation of some hypothesis about one of these
disorders. In the final analysis, any hypothesis
must be confirmed in the human setting. As a
model is not identical with the human disorder, it
is never fully or finally validated to then be a
stand-in for the human disorder. The proper and
potentially effective function of a model function is
as a locus of discovery, not of confirmation or justification.
This is a common misunderstanding, certainly in
the public’s view, and one often exploited by scientists, including some who know better. We cannot
and should not test an animal model to confirm a
hypothesis about a human disorder.
2. Even an animal model for which some degree of
validation has been demonstrated is not
necessarily a contribution to understanding or
treatment effectiveness.
Validity often is limited to the confirmation of
aspects of the model that are already known to
obtain in the modelled. They do not constitute new
findings. Validity is only a bottom line gain when it
involves an aspect validated in the target for the
first time. In principle, scientists can develop a high
fidelity model that teaches us nothing new about
the disorder or its treatment.
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3. Most animal models in biomedical and
psychological research are not validated, even in
the limited sense described. I return to this below.
The role of differences
Validity is limited as a criterion in the evaluation of
animal models, as it is restricted to the identification of similarities between model/modelled. However, we also learn from differences.
An important theory of meaning in contemporary
linguistics and philosophy is that meaning means
through contrast. Much of what we know of “up” is
through a consideration of “down”, of “right” by way
of “wrong”, even of “vertebrate” by comparison to
“invertebrate”. More generally, we understand something in context — the same word or even proposition
means differently in different contexts. Comparison,
contrast and differentness are the stuff of understanding.
Comparative history, religion, linguistics and
anatomy all provide a sophistication and depth of
understanding that study of a particular history or
anatomy does not. In what we seek to understand,
a range of variables is at play. The comparison of
differences helps expose that range. Consider individuals in one species contracting a disease that
those in a second species do not. Differences
between the two species are likely to be informative
to an understanding and treatment of the disease.
The study of differences as well as similarities generates hypotheses. Further, even a similarity disconfirmed, and thus invalidated, can be informative
or suggest treatment possibilities.
A strength of the strategy of using a model — any
model, whether or not animal — is that it is generative of an extensive, really inexhaustible, range of
hypotheses about the modelled. On the other hand,
that models have this limited generative function
and that there is no necessary relation between
degree of fidelity and the productiveness of that
generativity has strong ethical implications that
spike the move to the use of non-animal models.
The relation between model and target in
practice
I am arguing that the proper use of animal models
is the limited one of generating hypotheses that
must be validated in a human context and that, in
the evaluation of a given animal model, validity is
not a critical consideration. Let me reiterate this
thesis in a different way by taking a closer look at
the process of the animal research enterprise. We
need to distinguish among processes: a) in actual
practice; b) as presented in the media and white
papers by animal research advocates; and c) as they
are supposed to work.
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The practice in practice
My study of animal models of eating disorders
demonstrated that, rather than arising from extensive familiarity with the eating disorders in its
human settings, the models build on procedures
already in the scientific research repertoire. More
critically, once an animal model is defined, its development proceeds largely through further research
consisting of recursive and, often, duplicative investigation of already studied variables and of other
models within the experimental literature. In place
of continuous recourse to the target phenomenon
for validation of the models, it relies on confirmation by the insular criterion of consistency with
other comparably insulated research. In practice,
animal models are not validated, even in the limited
sense we have described.
The practice as presented
Often the media and animal research advocates
present the model as if it is the locus of justification
— the site of validation rather than of generation of
hypotheses. Their claim is that for all intents and
purposes, the model is truly a stand-in for the target. Any causal process or effective treatment that
obtains there, will obtain in the target. A model
once developed is fully validated and can be used to
test further hypotheses. In effect, the claim is that
the model is an identical to the modelled.
As was the case when animal models of infectious
diseases were developed by infecting the model with
the same germ that affects a human, with genetic
engineering, some scientists will present a model
that includes inserted human genes as identical to
the modelled. Although genetic engineering may
increase the likelihood that the hypothesis generated will be predictive in the modelled, the subsequent causal process, disease process and effective
treatment that obtains cannot be identical to that
in humans. Such models must be compared to
hypotheses generated by alternative models, such
as human tissue or organ cultures, or direct observation of processes with high-tech imaging.
The practice as it is supposed to work
Because it cannot be identical to the target, the animal model is limited to a hypothesis generator. It is a
locus of discovery not a locus of justification.
Discovery is the development of hypotheses, ideas,
speculations and justification is the testing of those
hypotheses and ideas. It is one of many possible loci.
Science traditionally has used other kinds of models
to generate hypotheses, beside animals — for example, machines (most recently the computer as a model
of the nervous system) and mathematical models (to
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predict the molecular structure of therapeutic drugs
and toxic chemicals). Of course, another locus of discovery is the target itself. In clinical practice involving the target population, discoveries are made that
are not yet formally tested. They can be tested first in
an animal model. This is done because scientists
value lab-based animal research more than they do
clinic-based research. They see the former as a more
controlled setting. They give up the presence of the
target phenomenon in a setting where there is less
control for a setting in which they have greater control but are working only with an analogue, a model
of the phenomenon. But, again, they eventually must
be tested in the clinical setting, accepting whatever
lesser control obtains there.
To clarify a possible point of confusion about the
model as locus of discovery: the hypothesis to be
tested in the target is itself a product of a scientific
process of hypothesis testing. Only those variables
that work in the model, at a statistical level, go on
to be tested in the target.
What are the odds that it will work — that the
results also will obtain in the target? What do they
need to be for this strategy of animal model to be
effective? Opponents of animal research, arguing
the science issue, often critically claim that the prediction rate is only 50%, a rate no better than tossing a coin. This is a misunderstanding of the
situation. Let’s say that the prediction rate is only
50% — this means that, half the time, the hypothesis developed in the model and tested in the target
will not be confirmed in the target. The causal relation of treatment effect does not reach a statistical
level of 0.05 even though it did in the model. This
rate is not a strong critique of the animal model
process unless there is a better method of generating hypotheses. The 50% success rate must be compared, not to a coin toss, but to other ways of
generating hypotheses — against both non-animal
models and hypotheses from clinical observation. If
these other ways only produce a 25% success rate,
then clearly, animal models are a more efficient way
of generating hypotheses.
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These comparisons, between other non-animal
models and the clinic as generators of hypotheses
that are confirmed in the modelled, are the critical
criteria in the evaluation of animal models. As we
have demonstrated, these hypotheses issue from
differences, as well as similarities.
Elsewhere I have described a scientific method
by which to evaluate these critical comparisons
through the use of citation analysis, survey of relevant practitioners, review of treatment evaluation literature and measures of invasiveness. I
also have suggested that historical analysis of the
provenance of findings supplement these social
and natural scientific analytic tests. Applying and
extending these methods, Dagg suggests the use
of a ratio of numbers of animals to numbers of
citations as a measure of effectiveness in the
evaluation of animal models of cancer research,
1990–1999 (7).
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